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1. Labor-Leisure  Choice 
This section extends the baseline model by allowing the household to choose the amount of 
time consumed as leisure. For simplicity, I abstract from altruistic bequests. In order to 
determine how abstracting from leisure choice affects the outcomes of the policy experiments, 
I also study a special case of the model in which leisure is fixed. 
1.1 Household  Problem 
The structure of the household problem is as follows. The household first solves the problem 
of lifetime utility maximization conditional on choosing each schooling level. The household 
then picks the level of s with the highest utility net of education costs. 
1.1.1  Household Problem for Given (q, s) 
Once the household has chosen a schooling level s, his optimization problem is as follows. 
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and subject to a sequence of budget constraints (displayed in the main text). Alternatively, a 
present value budget constraint can be imposed: 
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Here,  l denotes leisure, d is a tuition payment during school time, and y represents the 
earnings flow net of wage and job-training taxes. The Lagrangean for this problem is 








− δ − +
µ
+












a a a b a b a b x a b
s
a b a b w a b a b b
a
a a a b a b
a
h h q v x h G
D
z x c p d y T y D
l c u
1 1 , , , , ,
,
,




) 1 ( ) , , , (
) (
) , ( max
0
 
λ and µ denote Lagrange multipliers. Assuming an interior solution, the first-order conditions 
are:  2
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Here, it is understood that the previous four equations only hold for  a = aS+1, …, aR − 2. At 
age aR − 1, the household does not invest in human capital and vb,a = xb,a = µb,a = 0 and lb,a 
= lR which is the exogenous level of leisure during retirement. During schooling (a = aS) the 
household enjoys the exogenous leisure level l
S and job-training investment is, of course, zero. 
The first-order conditions can be simplified as follows. Leisure is determined by 
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A solution of the household problem then consists of age profiles for c, l, v, x, h, µ and a 
scalar λ that solve (1), (3), (6), (8), (9), (10), and the present value budget constraint (2). Asset 
holdings follow residually from the flow budget constraint. 
If leisure is fixed, the problem is modified as follows. The first-order condition for leisure (4) 
is replaced by an exogenous age-leisure profile. The other conditions determining household 
behavior and equilibrium remain unchanged.   3
Note that the problem with fixed leisure is still not identical to the one reported in the main 
text. One minor difference is that the agents’ endowment available for market time differs 
from the one in the main text. A more important difference is due to a peculiar feature of the 
household problem adopted from Heckman et al. (1998, 1999). In their education choice the 
households maximize the present value of earnings despite the fact that utility consists not 
only of the discounted stream of the u(cb,a), but also subtracts the nonpecuniary education 
cost ps. In the main text I nonetheless adopt Heckman et al.’s formulation because it provides 
a well-known and empirically successful benchmark model of education choice. Moreover, 
none of the results reported in the paper are modified, if agents are assumed to choose the 
education level that yields maximum lifetime utility instead. In other words, the model with 
fixed leisure presented in this appendix yields the same qualitative insights as the model 
presented in the main text. 
1.1.2 Solution  Algorithm 
The household problem is solved by iterating over guesses for λb, hb,a, and vb,a.  Given λ, the 
first-order condition for consumption (3) determines the marginal utility of consumption in all 
periods. The first-order condition (8) determines c / l. Together, these can be solved for the 
levels of c and l at all dates. The shadow price µ is then updated  using (7), starting from the 
last date using the guesses for v, x, h and the updated l. Next, the guess for v is updated by 
solving (5) for v:   
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where  ψ ϕ π = / ) / ( / w vh x  from (9) and  µ λ = / / w h Gv . The values of x are obtained from the 
identity  h v vh x x ) / ( = . Finally, the guesses for h are updated by iterating over its law of 
motion. 
1.1.3 Functional  Forms 
The utility function is  ) 1 /( ) ( ) , ( 1 σ − = σ − ξ l c l c u . Hence,  ) 1 ( / ) , ( ) 1 ( σ − ξ σ − = σ − = l c c l c u uc  and 
1 ) 1 ( 1 / ) , ( ) 1 ( − σ − ξ σ − ξ = σ − ξ = l c l l c u ul , so that  ) /( / c l u u l c ξ = . When l is interior, 
consumption is then determined by (3) together with  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ] / [ ) , ( σ − ξ σ − σ − ξ ξ = l c c u u c a b u . 
When l is fixed, as during retirement, consumption is determined by (3) together with 
) 1 ( σ − ξ σ − = l c uc .  4
1.2 Education  Choice 
After solving the above problem for each possible choice of s, the household compares the 
present discounted values of utility associated with each choice. It chooses the level of s that 
offers the largest present value of utility, net of its idiosyncratic draw of the non-pecuniary 
education cost. The education cost is determined as in the main text. 
1.3 Equilibrium 
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1.4 Parameters 
The only parameters that need to be chosen in addition to those described in the main text are 
those related to leisure preferences. Based on time-use studies (Juster and Stafford 1991) the 
leisure preference parameter ξ is chosen such that households spend on average 55 percent of 
their time endowment on leisure during ages 25 to 64. This leisure share is lower than the 
values typically used in the literature, but the figures are not comparable because the literature 
uses infinite horizon models. Leisure during retirement is set to l
R = 1 and during school it is 
set to l
S = 0.7. For the case of fixed leisure, I assume at constant leisure level of 0.7 during 
work life. 
1.5 Results 
This section presents numerical simulation results for the same experiments as reported in the 
main text, except that the household is now allowed to choose labor supply. The calculations 
show that all of the findings reported in the paper continue to hold. Labor-leisure choice alters 
the outcomes of most experiment substantially, but the comparisons between models with 
alternative assumptions about intergenerational persistence are similar to those reported in the 
paper. 
First, consider experiments that do not directly distort job-training decisions. Table 1 shows 
the changes in aggregates due to a move from progressive to proportional income taxation. 
The first column shows the outcomes for the model with fixed leisure and no intergenerational  5
persistence. The second column adds labor-leisure choice. The third column adds 
intergenerational persistence of ability and education. 
Leisure choice implies much larger level effects of the tax change (compare columns 1 and 2). 
This finding is well-known from the literature (e.g. Trostel 1993). However, the discrepancy 
between the models with and without intergenerational persistence are even smaller than in 
the baseline model without labor-leisure choice (compare columns 2 and 3). Similar findings 
hold for other experiments that do not directly distort the incentives for job-training 
investment, such as the move to a consumption tax or the introduction of an education 
subsidy. The results are therefore not reported. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]   
Next consider a policy change that directly distorts job-training decisions. As in the main text, 
the experiment subsidizes job-training inputs by 40% (τx = −0.4), financed by adjusting lump-
sum transfers. The results are shown in table 2 for the same three models as above. As in the 
case of the proportional tax system, leisure choice substantially magnifies the effects of the 
policy change. Consistent with the results reported in the main text, the discrepancy between 
models with and without intergenerational persistence is somewhat larger than for 
experiments that do not strongly distort job-training investment. In sum, allowing for labor-
leisure choice does not alter any of the steady state conclusions derived from the baseline 
model.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]   
2.  Alternative Policy Experiments 
This section reports the outcomes for several policy experiments commonly studied in the 
literature. The main conclusion is that in each case a conventional life-cycle model yields 
outcomes that are quite similar to the baseline model with realistic intergenerational mobility. 
The first experiment is a revenue neutral move to a consumption tax (see Heckman et al. 
1999; Davies and Whalley 1991). This experiment sets all income tax rates to zero and adjusts 
the consumption tax rate to maintain government revenues unchanged. The results are 
reported in table 3, which mirrors the structure of table 4 in the text. The first column shows 
the changes in aggregates generated by a standard life-cycle model. The second column adds 
intergenerational persistence of education. The third column adds persistence of ability and 
represents the findings from a model with realistic intergenerational mobility. As in the 
proportional tax experiment, intergenerational persistence has little impact on the tax effects.  6
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]   
Table 4 shows the results from eliminating capital income taxation, which is a commonly 
studied tax reform in the literature (e.g., Lucas 1990, Davies and Whalley 1991). The wage 
tax rate is adjusted to maintain constant government revenues. Table 5 displays the outcomes 
of subsidizing tuition by 25 percent, financed by adjusting lump-sum transfers (e.g., Heckman 
et al. 1999). In both cases, the results confirm the main finding of the paper that a 
conventional life-cycle model closely approximates the properties of the baseline model. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]   
The conclusions for transitional dynamics are similar. To illustrate, figure 1 shows the 
trajectory of aggregate output following the move to consumption taxation (the experiment 
underlying table 3). The trajectory generated by the model without intergenerational 
persistence is close to those of the baseline model with realistic persistence.
1 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]    
Table 6 replicates an experiment of Davies and Whalley (1991). It is a move from 
proportional income to consumption taxation, where job-training investment is not tax-
deductible. The initial steady state has proportional labor and capital income taxes (τK = 0.5; 
τw = 0.2). The non-deductibility of job-training inputs is captured by setting  τx = −τw. The 
experiment sets income tax rates and τx to zero. A consumption tax is introduced that keeps 
tax revenues unchanged. For this experiment, intergenerational persistence magnifies the tax 
effects by similar amounts as for the job-training subsidy studied in the main text. In both 
cases output increases by an additional 1.5% due to intergenerational persistence. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]   
                                                 
1 The transition path is shown only for the first 140 years, but is computed for 500 years to ensure 
complete convergence to the new steady state.  7
3.  Tables for Technical Appendix 
 
Table 1.  Steady state effects of moving to a proportional income tax.   









Output 1.4 9.5  9.5
Capital stock  -0.8 2.1  2.0
Labor input  2.3 12.9  12.8
High school labor input  (L
1) 1.0 11.8  11.8
College labor input  (L
2) 5.0 15.2  15.0
High school wage rate  (ω
1)  0.0 -2.3 -2.4
College wage rate  (ω
2)  -2.7 -4.3 -4.3
Quintile ratio  10.2 15.5  15.8
College premium  54.6 86.1  94.7
Galton coefficient for earnings  -- --  12.9
  
Percentage point changes   
Fraction with college  -3.2 -5.9  -6.3
    q = 1  -8.3 -8.4  -8.3
    q = 2  -7.3 -10.5  -11.4
    q = 3  -5.7 -10.3  -11.9
    q = 4  8.2 5.7  6.1
Fraction among college 
educated with q = 1 
-9.0 -9.0 -8.7
    with q = 4  18.5 25.0  28.2
Pr(q = 4)  0.0 0.0  0.3
Pr(s = 2 | s
P) with s
P = 1  -3.2 -5.9  -3.4
with s
P = 2  -3.2 -5.9  -4.3
  8
Table 2.  Steady state effects of a 40% job-training subsidy     









Output 3.2 9.4  11.0
Capital stock  -7.1 -5.1  -3.9
Labor input  7.9 16.2  18.1
High school labor input  (L
1) 9.5 18.3  20.3
College labor input  (L
2) 4.6 11.9  13.4
High school wage rate  (ω
1)  -5.4 -7.0 -7.2
College wage rate  (ω
2)  -2.3 -3.4 -3.3
Quintile ratio  -3.2 -5.1  -5.2
College premium  53.5 82.5  79.3
Galton coefficient for earnings  -- --  13.9
  
Percentage point changes   
Fraction with college  -5.8 -8.2  -8.1
    q = 1  -8.4 -8.4  -8.4
    q = 2  -11.5 -14.3  -13.9
    q = 3  -8.9 -14.6  -16.5
    q = 4  5.5 4.4  2.9
Fraction among college 
educated with q = 1 
-9.0 -8.7 -8.8
    with q = 4  24.5 34.5  37.4
Pr(q = 4)  0.0 0.0  2.0
Pr(s = 2 | s
P) with s
P = 1  -5.8 -8.2  -4.1
with s
P = 2  -5.8 -8.2  -7.7
  9
Table 3.  Steady state effects of a consumption tax.     
Percentage changes  No intergenerational 
transmission




Output 5.5 5.5  6.0
Capital stock  9.8 9.8  10.3
Labor input  3.7 3.7  4.2
High school labor input  (L
1) 1.6 1.7  2.1
College labor input  (L
2) 8.1 7.8  8.6
High school wage rate  (ω
1)  3.2 3.1 3.1
College wage rate  (ω
2)  -1.1 -1.0 -1.2
Quintile ratio  10.9 11.5  11.2
College premium  66.8 67.4  68.5
Galton coefficient for earnings  -- --  5.3
  
Percentage point changes   
Fraction with college  -3.8 -3.8  -3.9
    q = 1  -8.1 -7.6  -7.7
    q = 2  -9.4 -9.9  -10.2
    q = 3  -10.3 -10.9  -11.5
    q = 4  12.7 13.0  12.8
Fraction among college 
educated with q = 1 
-8.7 -8.0 -8.2
    with q = 4  26.3 27.0  28.6
Pr(q = 4)  0.0 0.0  0.6
Pr(s = 2 | s
P) with s
P = 1  -3.8 0.8  -2.1
with s
P = 2  -3.8 -15.0  -2.6
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Table 4.  Steady state effects of eliminating the capital income tax    
Percentage changes  No intergenerational 
transmission
Only transmission of 
schooling 
Baseline model
Output 3.7 3.7  4.0
Capital stock  10.1 10.1  10.4
Labor input  1.0 1.0  1.4
High school labor input  (L
1) 0.8 0.8  1.2
College labor input  (L
2) 1.5 1.4  1.8
High school wage rate  (ω
1)  2.8 2.7 2.7
College wage rate  (ω
2)  2.3 2.3 2.3
Quintile ratio  -0.5 -0.5  -0.5
College premium  10.1 10.9  10.4
Galton coefficient for earnings  -- --  0.8
  
Percentage point changes   
Fraction with college  -0.5 -0.6  -0.5
    q = 1  -1.5 -1.6  -1.5
    q = 2  -0.9 -1.0  -1.2
    q = 3  -0.8 -0.9  -1.0
    q = 4  1.2 1.3  1.2
Fraction among college 
educated with q = 1 
-1.5 -1.6 -1.6
    with q = 4  2.5 2.7  3.1
Pr(q = 4)  0.0 0.0  0.3
Pr(s = 2 | s
P) with s
P = 1  -0.5 0.0  -0.3
with s
P = 2  -0.5 -1.4  -0.2
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Table 5.  Steady state effects of an education subsidy     
Percentage changes  No intergenerational 
transmission
Only transmission of 
schooling 
Baseline model
Output -0.4 -0.4  -0.1
Capital stock  0.2 0.1  0.4
Labor input  -0.6 -0.7  -0.3
High school labor input  (L
1) -2.2 -2.5  -2.1
College labor input  (L
2) 2.9 3.4  3.5
High school wage rate  (ω
1)  1.4 1.6 1.5
College wage rate  (ω
2)  -2.1 -2.5 -2.4
Quintile ratio  8.7 9.4  8.7
College premium  -71.3 -76.6  -73.4
Galton coefficient for earnings  -- --  -2.2
  
Percentage point changes   
Fraction with college  4.8 5.3  5.1
    q = 1  15.6 16.8  15.4
    q = 2  5.6 6.1  6.6
    q = 3  1.2 1.5  1.7
    q = 4  -3.1 -3.2  -3.5
Fraction among college 
educated with q = 1 
12.4 13.2 11.9
    with q = 4  -11.0 -11.7  -11.5
Pr(q = 4)  0.0 0.0  0.2
Pr(s = 2 | s
P) with s
P = 1  4.8 1.3  2.9
with s
P = 2  4.8 7.5  2.7
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Table 6. Steady state effects of a consumption tax. Job-training not tax-deductible.    
Percentage changes  No intergenerational 
transmission




Output 14.3 14.3  15.8
Capital stock  36.5 36.5  38.0
Labor input  5.9 5.9  7.4
High school labor input  (L
1) 4.3 4.4  5.8
College labor input  (L
2) 9.4 9.3  10.9
High school wage rate  (ω
1)  9.1 9.0 8.9
College wage rate  (ω
2)  5.5 5.6 5.4
Quintile ratio  -2.1 -1.9  -1.9
College premium  80.4 83.1  79.9
Galton coefficient for earnings  -- --  8.7
  
Percentage point changes   
Fraction with college  -4.5 -4.6  -4.5
    q = 1  -8.4 -8.4  -8.4
    q = 2  -11.5 -11.7  -12.0
    q = 3  -12.5 -13.3  -13.8
    q = 4  14.5 14.9  13.5
Fraction among college 
educated with q = 1 
-9.1 -9.1 -9.1
    with q = 4  31.7 32.8  34.5
Pr(q = 4)  0.0 0.0  1.4
Pr(s = 2 | s
P) with s
P = 1  -4.5 1.0  -2.2
with s
P = 2  -4.5 -19.0  -4.1
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Figure 1.  Transition path following the move to consumption taxation     14
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